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Abstract
This paper provides evidence for a particular channel through which
sustained terrorism in rural areas may a¤ect growth in developing coun-
tries. Using micro-level data from agricultural surveys during the period
of insurgency in Punjab (India), I nd signicant negative e¤ects of ter-
rorism on the level of investment in long-term agricultural technology but
e¤ects are small and insignicant for short-term investment. The presence
of a major terrorist incident in a district in a year reduces long-term xed
investment by around 17% after controlling for district xed-e¤ects, time
trends, district trends and other farm-level controls. These negative ef-
fects are greater for richer farmers and those living in bordering districts.
This results in a farmer losing close to 4% of his income annually because
of the insurgency.
1 Introduction
In the past few years, there has been a growing interest in the micro-level
approach to studying consequences of violent conict. The empirical literature
which was earlier limited to cross-sectional results has now taken strides into
case studies and researchers using household-level panel data are coming closer
towards making causal inferences by mitigating problems of reverse causality
and omitted variable bias1 . This paper lies at the intersection of economic e¤ects
of violent conict as well as terrorism, particularly looking at rural developing
areas.
I am grateful to Oriana Bandiera and Gerard Padro who gave me unstinting support. I
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ted through valuable comments by Madhav Aney, Fernando Aragon, Tilman Brück, Greg
Fischer, Maitreesh Ghatak, Simon Luechinger and Ricardo Ribeiro. I would also like to thank
all LSE Work-in-Progress Development seminar participants. Thanks also go to the Economic
Advisor to the Government of Punjab and the Punjab Agriculture Department who helped
me obtain data and information on timings of investment.
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1For instance, Households in Conict Network (www.hicn.org) has an impressive collection
of recent microeconomic forays looking at civil conict.
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There has not been much work on the microeconomic impact of terrorism2 ,
although several studies have analyzed macroeconomic e¤ects3 . However, there
are at least ve dimensions that are salient in studying microeconomic outcomes
of conict in general. First, there seem to be immediate adverse e¤ects on long-
term investments, for example, educational attainment post-conict in Rwanda
(Akresh and de Walque, 2009) as well as in Peru (León, 2009)4 . Also, negative
e¤ects of civil conict on health outcomes have been found in Burundi (Akresh,
Bundervoet et al, 2009), Iraq (Guerrero-Serdán, 2009) and Colombia (Camacho,
2008). However, we do not know the e¤ects of conict on long-term vis-à-vis
short-term investment. Second, we know little about the persistence of these
e¤ects although several studies nd no long-run e¤ect of bombings on income
levels in Vietnam (Miguel and Roland, 2005), Japan (Davis and Weinstein,
2002) and West Germany (Brakman, Garrtesen and Schramm, 2004). How-
ever, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) uncover persistent e¤ects on per capita
income of low-intensity conict in Basque country. Third, there can be het-
erogeneous e¤ects of conict on di¤erent types of investments based on farmer
characteristics, for instance, rich may be more a¤ected than the poor for long-
term investments. Fourth, it is important to check if these decisions are in
line with theory or if individuals behave di¤erently from economic predictions
in such a scenario, for example, Brück (2004) nds that economic predictions
about high-risk crops (like cotton) increasing welfare do not hold in a post-war
economy. Similarly, Bundervoet (2007) nds that wealthier households do not
invest less in low-risk low-return activities compared to poorer households dur-
ing civil war. Fifth, channels through which conict a¤ects investment need to
be better understood.
I will try and address the above dimensions in the context of an insurgency
that took place in the Indian state of Punjab during 1981-1993. Although, the
conict in Punjab has occasionally been categorized as a case of civil war, it can
perhaps more accurately be called an insurgency where rural insurgents used
terrorism as a method for trying to obtain secession. Using data from annual
surveys on representative farmers and district-wise major terrorist incidents, I
nd signicantly large negative e¤ects of terrorism on the level of long term
agricultural technology as opposed to small insignicant e¤ects on short term
investment. Long term technology is proxied by expenditure on wells and tube-
wells. The e¤ects are comparatively much smaller for investment in fertilizers,
which yield only short term returns. Farmers may be thought of as entrepreneurs
who are willing to invest in agricultural technologies if the expected returns are
2An exception is Becker and Rubinstein (2004) who show using micro level data from
co¤ee shops in Israel that consumption substantially decreased after terror strikes, but this
was not the case for consumers who were spending a large amount of their income on such
consumption.
3For instance, see Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004), Gupta et al (2004), Eldor and Melnick
(2004) and Frey et al (2007) for e¤ects of terrorism on output, public spending, stock markets
and life satisfaction.
4Shemyakina (2006) looks at the 1992-1998 conict in Tajikistan and nds exposure to
violence leads to a lower likelihood of being enrolled in school, especially for girls. León
(2009) also nds a persistent e¤ect on educational attainment that is decreasing over time.
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high enough relative to their outside options. Between 1987-1992, the agricul-
tural growth rate in Punjab dipped from 6% to 2% and the World Bank report
(2004) conjectured that this may have happened due to a decline in long-term
investment amidst the uncertainty surrounding militancy activities. This paper
empirically validates that there was a decline in long-term investment because
of violent conict.
I also nd that these e¤ects on investment decisions are not persistent but
the e¤ect on farm income kicks in after a year. The e¤ects seem to be greater
for farmers living in bordering districts and additionally, there is evidence to
suggest a greater reduction in investment by richer farmers. At the macro-level,
irrigation has been shown to be associated with a decrease in rural poverty and
an increase in agricultural growth in India (Bhattarai and Narayanmoorthy,
2003). Thus, terrorism may have an adverse e¤ect on growth through a decline
in investment. De Long and Summers (1991) illustrate using cross-country
evidence how increasing investment in machinery equipment by 1% of GDP leads
to an increase in growth of one-third of a percent. I too, nd a delayed e¤ect on
the income of the farmer. In particular, I nd that an average farmer in the state
loses close to 4% of his annual income because of the Punjab insurgency during
1981-90. Thus, it is imperative to understand how investment in agricultural
equipment responds to conict as this may have large growth e¤ects. The
relative importance of channels through which violence may a¤ect investment
would have di¤erent policy implications.
Economic intuition suggests that violent conict should decrease invest-
ment. Indeed, Deininger (2003) shows that conict decreased investment in
non-agricultural enterprise setups in Uganda, it is not immediately obvious that
rms could stand to gain. Guidolin and La Ferrara (2004) present an interesting
case of diamond-mining rms in Angola that show a loss in value when the civil
war comes to a sudden end. This could be explained by lack of transparency
during the civil war where rms could get away with illegal dealings or because
the civil war had raised the barriers to entry. In the case of agrarian Punjab, the
farms could be thought of as rms5 . If for instance, the farm produce obtained
a higher price from the central government when there were terrorist incidents,
we could expect them to increase their investment when there are terrorist in-
cidents. Moreover, in the case of Punjab double cropping had increased water
requirements, and the new strains of wheat needed a lot of water supply. Suren-
dar Singh (1991) argues that during the insurgency, canal irrigation lacked the
kind of exibility and reliability that could be secured by tube-well irrigation.
It was not always available at the desired time and in required volume, so we
might expect the farmers to invest more in tube wells especially if reliability of
canal irrigation was reduced by terrorism.
On the other hand, insecurity of life and property should discourage agricul-
tural investment as would an environment with heightened uncertainty and high
operating costs for rms. Besley (1995) provides evidence of the link between
5Although it has only 3% of Indias net sown area and 1.5% of its farming population,
Punjab produces 10% of the countrys rice, 20% of its wheat and 45% of all rice and wheat
procured by the government (World Bank report, 2004).
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property rights and investment in Ghana and argues that improving property
rights could increase investment in three possible ways. First, people would be
more secure about their future and will therefore invest more. Second, because
land would be easier to collateralize, it would increase land investment. Third,
through expanded possibilities from trade6 .
The paper is organized as follows. After a brief historical background in
Section 2, more light is shed on the underlying channels in Punjabs case in
Section 3. Data is described in Section 4 and Section 5 reports the empirical
specication followed by core results in Section 6. Next, I highlight robustness
checks and concerns in Sections 7 and 8. Heterogeneous treatment e¤ects are
tested for in Section 9 and implications for policy are suggested in Section 10.
2 Historical background
The insurgency in Punjab has not been studied by economists, although
there have been several studies in sociology and anthropology7 . In 1981, the
population of Punjab was 16.7 million out of which 12 million lived in rural areas.
The population density was 333 persons per square km and though it occupied
only 1.5% of Indias land, it contributed close to 4% to the national GDP. Sikhs
formed more than 60% of the population and in rural areas, their proportion
went up to over 80%. In 1978, Bhindranwale, who was the head priest of a
religious organization Dam Dama Taksal started recruiting Sikhs under AISSF
for the cause of an autonomous Sikh region8 . What initially began as protests
against the Nirankaris (a "sect" of the Sikhs) rapidly resulted in attacks against
Hindus9 . These were followed by attacks on policemen, farmers, police informers
and civilians and a multitude of militant groups sprouted proclaiming to ght
for a Sikh nation called Khalistan. Thus, the rst phase of the conict can be
classied as ethnic conict (Besançon, 2005).
In 1985, Presidents rule that had been imposed in 1984 following riots was
lifted with a peace accord between the Indian state and a moderate representa-
tive of the militant groups. The accord referred all issues relating to autonomy
of the state to several commissions. The accord, however, was never fully imple-
mented by the central government (Telford, 1992). Death toll due to violence
rose from 1,333 in 1987 to 5,265 in 1991 and tapered to 871 in 1993. By 1994,
the police declared that terrorism had been defeated and that normalcy had
returned.
6The third channel seems unlikely here as the farmers surveyed sold their produce within
the state.
7For example, Judge et al (1999) interview villagers about motivations, traits and activities
of terrorist ghters for Khalistan. Axel (2001) gives an anthropological account of how the
formation of a diaspora contributed to the struggle for a separate nation.
8Apart from increased autonomy, the rebel groups also wanted transference of Chandigarh
to Punjab, redrawing of borders to include Punjabi-speaking areas in Punjab and a greater
share of river water for the state.
9One of the major attacks on Hindus was that of Jagat Narain, a Hindu editor and political
leader, who was shot dead in a vastly publicized incident in 1981. He was against the idea of
a separate Sikh nation.
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Figure 1: Map of Punjab showing regional variations in conict over time
1981-83 1984 1985-89
Punjab is arguably a case of where persistent and heightened rural terrorism
was used within a secessionist movement rather than that of civil war even
though it has been categorized by the UCDP/PRIO Armed conict dataset as
undergoing civil war from 1983 to 1993 due to the number of civilians killed.
One can also consider the secessionist movement as an insurgency as Fearon
(2003) calls it "a technology of military conict typical of guerrilla warfare
operating from a rural base through small and lightly armed bandits." The
technology used by insurgents to further their economic and political goals was
extortions10 . Having a rural base was essential as this helped them remain
hidden from the police forces. Kidnapping was an e¢ cient technology used
by militants to extract their rents (Judge et al, 1999). Figure 1 shows the
dispersion of terrorism over time to all districts and the increase in its intensity.
Until 1986, guerilla activities were sporadic and uncoordinated, largely conned
to the border regions. Between 1987-88, resistance began to proliferate and
the strength of groups surged. The deep red areas in the gure show areas of
intense conict. By 1989, all districts had witnessed at least one major terrorist
incident. Puri and Judge (1999) nd through recall surveys that two-thirds
of the militants were from landless labourer and small farmer communities, 22
percent were middle-income farmers and a small percentage were rich. Close to
80 percent were between the age of 14-25.
10 In a Police Intelligence report (6th February, 1987) shared with me by a former police
commissioner: The extortion money is used by the terrorists to enrich themselves, to purchase
weapons, and to get associates released from police or courts. There are disturbing trends in
the recruitment of terrorists. There is respect for the relatives of terrorists. They are always
o¤ered tea by the villagers. There are now 15 major terrorist groups with 10 to 30 members
each and having sophisticated weapons.
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Of all victims, 71 per cent came from rural areas (Kumar et al, 2001). Pet-
tigrews (1995) detailed sociological studies on the Punjab insurgency showed
that guerrilla activity had been persistent and every district was a¤ected by it.
Armed groups stalked the countryside and the distinction between a policeman
and a militant became blurred as guerilla cadres were inltrated by undercover
policemen. Later in the insurgency, ordinary villagers were targeted in violence
where armed bands looted farming families and the rural households were sub-
jected to attacks on their lives and property. The viability of the insurgency
was dependent on the coerced cooperation of the local population to provide
them with food, shelter, money and safety. These patterns are consistent with
Schechter (2004) which nds an increase in giving of gifts when trust is low and
probability of theft high in rural Paraguay.
3 Conceptual framework
Let pjt be the probability of a district j su¤ering from a major terrorist
attack in a given year t in district j. Assume that the probability of a farmer
being attacked is exogenously determined at the district level. This means
that the probability of a farmer being hit within a district is the same for all
farmers. Here, "being hit" does not necessarily mean that the farmer will be
personally attacked. It could also be that output-input markets are impacted for
farmers such that the output price increases or the price of inputs is adversely
a¤ected. Thus, it can be considered as a general decline in safety or security in
the district. For example, Besley and Mueller (2009) argue that the sustained
violence in Northern Ireland was a local public bad associated with killings in
a neighborhood. In Punjabs case too, as the probability of being personally
attacked by insurgents is very low if it is measured by the number of killings in
a district divided by the population of farmers in that district. For instance, in
the terrorist-prone district of Amritsar there were on average 35 major killings
per year between 1978-89, but the population of Amritsars rural male farmers
in 1981 was 324,736 according to the Census of India. Thus, it may be plausible
to think about killings in the district as a¤ecting the farmer through negative
shocks to either present or future prices of inputs as well as outputs11 .
The farmer can invest in two types of assets: short-term and long-term
agricultural equipment. The long-term equipment requires a xed cost in time
period t and then no investment is required for the next T years where T is the
expected time horizon for the long-term equipment. Short-term investment is
more exible as the farmer can change his investment level every season. The
expected time horizon is normalized to one year for the short-term equipment.
Also, the farmer reduces his investment if probability of being hit at least once
in a given time period exceeds pit; which is a function of his outside option, say
11 It is possible, however, that at an extremely local level, violence is endogenous to the
farmers investments. But, we are not measuring local violence. We are using major terrorist
killings at the district level as a proxy for the public bad and this has fewer problems
associated with reverse causality.
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wit. Assume that p0(wit) < 0: This implies that as the outside option becomes
more attractive, it reduces the threshold level below which the farmer invests
in agricultural equipment. We know that the probability of being hit at least
once in n periods is equal to [1  (1  pjt)n].
He will invest in short-term equipment if:
pjt < p(wit) (1)
He will invest in long-term equipment if:
1  (1  pjt)T < p(wit) (2)
The farmer always invests in short-term equipment if condition (2) for long-
term equipment is satised but will not invest in long-term equipment if (1)
holds but (2) does not hold12 . Therefore, the decision to invest in longer-term
equipment will be more sensitive to the probability of being attacked.
There are several points to keep in mind while understanding the conceptual
framework above. First, it assumes that there are no complementarities between
short-term and long-term investment. For example, short-term investment may
be of little use unless the farmer also invests in long-term investment. In our
context, however, equipment for tubewells is not essential for augmenting fertil-
izer productivity as there are other ways through which water can be supplied
to the crops, including rain water, older wells, canal water and taking water
from nearby farms.
Second, the channels of decrease in the short-term and long-term investment
are not modeled explicitly. For example, there may have been supply-side shocks
that may have a¤ected the two di¤erentially when the farmer is hit. A perpet-
ual shortage of electricity following terrorist attacks may have disincentivized
investment in electric motors for the tube well but may not have changed any
returns to investment in fertilizers. Daljit Singh (1992) mentions that during
the 1980s, the cost of tube-well irrigation by electricity was three to four times
more than canal irrigation, and uninterrupted supply of power from diesel and
electricity was hardly assured13 . Grewal and Rangi (1989) report that procure-
ment prices o¤ered to farmers by the government for wheat could not keep pace
with increases in the price of inputs. This points to either a decrease in the
expected selling price of output or an increase in the price of capital (either
directly or if long-term loans become more expensive), or a change in the ex-
pected rate of growth when the farmers district is hit with a terrorist shock14 .
The channel could also be through a change in wage level or labor market struc-
ture. For instance, Greenbaum et al. (2007) study the impact of terrorism on
employment in Italy from 1985 to 1997 and nd that terrorist attacks reduce
employment in the year following an attack. It would be useful to distinguish
between the individual channels empirically, but this is not possible at present
with the available data.
12This result only becomes stronger if the threat of extortion increases when long-term
investment is visible to outsiders.
13Also, the time horizon of the investments may change.
14Also, the outside option may itself be lower for farmers in districts that have a shock of
violence as other investment opportunities may shrink.
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Another channel that is possible is through the variance of returns caused
by uncertainty in prices due to the terrorist incidents. The World Bank report
(2004) hinted at increased uncertainty for farmers resulting from militancy ac-
tivities. Adapting the model of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) to our case, we can
show that if terrorism decreases the drift parameter and increases the uncer-
tainty parameter, the net e¤ect would be ambiguous. Empirically, periods of
increased ination uncertainty have been associated with substantially lower in-
vestments in xed assets among Dominican micro-entrepreneurs (Fischer, 2009).
Aggregate and industry-wide uncertainty exert a signicantly negative e¤ect on
xed investment (Ogawa and Suzuki, 2000). However, uncertainty may not
necessarily lead to lower investment, even in the presence of irreversibility of
investment (Abel and Eberly, 1994).
Third, the model gives no prediction about the extent of the decline in
investment. It would be more useful to calibrate the parameters on which the
investments are a¤ected using the data. This would require dynamic modeling
with a pre-specied production function, but I lack evidence on the returns to
short term and long term investments in this setting.
Fourth, there may also be an element of fear that reduces not only the invest-
ment but also the utility gained from an extra unit of consumption that could
in turn a¤ect investment decisions (Becker and Rubinstein, 2008) if households
are assumed to be utility-maximizers rather than prot-maximizing rms.
Fifth, risk aversion of farmers may be di¤erent for richer farmers. Indeed,
Binswangers (1981) experiment among farmers in India found decreasing ab-
solute risk-aversion. This implies that as the farmers wealth increases, he is
more willing to take risks. For our empirical analysis, it would suggest that
richer farmers are less likely to reduce their investment during conict. On the
other hand, richer farmers may also be more likely to use other complementary
inputs (labour or capital) that are likely to become more expensive. Therefore,
the e¤ect of terrorism on investment for richer farmers is theoretically ambigu-
ous. It has also been common to assume that individuals exhibit increasing
partial risk aversion, i.e., more risk aversion for higher stakes (Menezes and
Hanson, 1970). This bolsters the result from earlier mechanisms on why longer-
term investments that require xed costs may be a¤ected more than short-term
investments during conict.
4 Data
The data on investments of 510 farmers is taken from twelve annual sub-
district level surveys (from July, 1978 to June, 1990) conducted by a team
working for the Economic Advisor to the Government of Punjab. These were
taken between July and June (an agricultural year). From each sub-district, one
household was selected and this was repeated every year. The structure of data is
that it is household-level data that is in repeated cross-section form. From each
sub-district, one household has been sampled annually but di¤erent households
have been surveyed every year. It is an unbalanced-panel on 46 sub-districts as
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35 1978
39 1979
37 1980
44 1981
44 1982
43 1983
43 1984
43 1985
45 1986
45 1987
46 1988
46 1989
Table 1: Number of households surveyed every year
Agricultural year
Number of households
sampled
Notes:
1) The total number of households surveyed is equal
to 510.
2) An Agricultural year lasts from July to June.
all sub-districts were not surveyed every year, especially between 1978-81 when
violence had not started. Table 1 illustrates the number of households surveyed
(each from a di¤erent sub-district) for every year.
The surveys are supposed to be representative of the farmers in the state.
According to Raikhy and Mehra (2000), only 8% of the workers were employed
in industry in 1981 and farming was the predominant occupation in Punjab. The
main objectives of family budget and farm account surveys were to assess the
extent of income accruing from di¤erent sources, to examine the level of expen-
diture on various household items of expenditure and to determine the extent
of surplus or decit of family budgets. The selection depended on the represen-
tative character of the cultivating holding for the area and the willingness and
capability of the cultivator to record agricultural data about agricultural oper-
ations on his farm and family budgets. Only farmers who used bullock-carts for
cultivation were taken for the entire period. Bullock-cart was the primary mode
of cultivation in districts of Punjab though tractors became more common in
late 1980s.
The sample included all types of farmers - well to do, average and poor. The
average farm income per capita for a sampled farmer in 1981 was Rs. 4096,
whereas the average per capita income in the state was Rs. 3126 according to
the Census of India statistics. A register with a set of instructions was supplied
to the selected cultivators for recording day-to-day income from various sources
and expenditure on agricultural inputs. Two investigators posted at the block
level visited the selected cultivators once a month to help the cultivator in
completing the required entries in the register. The completed registers were
collected from the cultivators at the end of the agricultural year. Each farmers
was paid Rs. 75 for maintaining these records.
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Farm surveys from July, 1990 onwards are not available which was a period
of even greater violence. Summary statistics for the farm surveys are given in
Table 2a. The gures reveal roughly the same amount of money being invested
in both wells and fertilizers. In our sample, there were on average 8 family
members and the average area held was 4.6 hectares in 1981. According to the
Census of India report, each household in Punjab had on average 6 members in
a household in 1981. However, this includes the urban households where family
size was less. The median farm size in Punjab in 1981 was close to 4 hectares,
showing the representativeness of the farmers.
Expenditure on wells comprised of new investment on electric motors, pumps,
belts, boring pipes, water tanks, sprinklers and pump houses and also the inter-
est payable if loans taken. Expenditure on repairs, replacements, diesel oil and
electricity for the wells was also included in this gure, although no breakdown
is available. It should be considered as a good proxy for investment in long-term
agricultural technology as the average depreciation on wells is only 3% per year.
Buying components for wells is a xed investment that accrues returns over a
long horizon and is not as lumpy due to the availability of several parts. For
example, Michael et al. (2008) report the average life of centrifugal pumps to be
between 15-25 years, electric motors between 25-35 years, and galvanized iron
pipes and hydrants between 20-40 years in Punjab. Chadha (1985) reports that
in 1984, 58.65% of the cultivated area was irrigated by tube wells compared to
41% by government canals. Expenditure on fertilizers includes chemical fertil-
izers, compost and farm yard manure (whether home produced or purchased)
during the year. Home produced manure was priced at village rates. As fertil-
izers are perishable commodities generally used on only one crop, this can be
considered as a short-term investment.
The data set on terrorism has been taken from the South Asia Terrorism
Portal, which has a district-wise record of all major terrorist incidents in the
state15 . Major terrorist incidents are those where the number of civilians killed
were greater than or equal to 3. There are 1045 major terrorist killings recorded
in the data set and 149 incidents. In total, major as well as minor incidents
accounted for 5070 civilian killings during the period 1978-1989, but the minor
incidents have not been disaggregated district-wise. However, the temporal
pattern in terrorist killings of civilians in major incidents and civilians killed in
all terrorist incidents is remarkably similar at the state-level. Major terrorist
killings start from 1981 with average terrorist killings being 9.7 in a district in a
year and average terrorism cases being 1.4. Annual crime statistics of district-
level murders and thefts have been taken from the Crime Records Bureau in New
Delhi. Table 2b shows that annual mean terrorist incidents, killings, murders
and thefts for each district.
15The former Director General of Police in Punjab, K.P.S. Gill heads the Institute of Conict
and Management, which runs the South Asia Terrorism Portal.
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Wells 510 1086 733 0 4141
Fertilizers 510 1154 586 15 3944
Seeds 510 370 4337 2584 35632
Implements 510 257 601 51 8767
Rent 510 3376 250 5 3078
Farm expenditure 510 10595 1579 491 13586
Farm income 510 39529 26672 -2123 166900
Total family members 510 8.15 3.42 2 23
Area held in hectares 510 4.87 2.51 1.21 21.46
Table 2a: Summary Statistics from farm surveys
District Obs Mean terrorist incidents Mean terrorist killings Mean murders Mean thefts
Amritsar 12 5.92 35 235 341
Bhatinda 12 0.33 2 73 131
Faridkot 12 0.5 6 73 129
Ferozepur 12 0.92 5 76 136
Gurdaspur 12 1.08 7 85 157
Hoshiarpur 12 0.25 6 39 103
Jalandhar 12 1.25 6 78 283
Kapurthala 12 0.67 4 24 70
Ludhiana 12 0.5 4 82 289
Patiala 12 0.75 10 57 216
Ropar 12 0.17 3 25 85
Sangrur 12 0.08 1 55 113
Punjab (total) 144 12.42 87 902 2053
Table 2b: District-wise annual means of terrorist incidents and crime (1978-1989)
Notes:
1) The variables, terrorist incidents and terrorist killings have been recorded from South Asia Terrorism
Portal's data on terrorism in Punjab.  Terrorist incidents are recorded only if it is classified as “major”,
i.e. if killings are greater than equal to 3 in that incident. Terrorist killings measure the killings in major
terrorist incidents.
2) murders and thefts are absolute numbers of the crimes in each district over the period 1978-1989
(inclusive of both years). These are available from the Crime Records Bureau, New Delhi, India.
5 Empirical methodology
5.1 Specication
Baseline regressions to nd the reduced form causal e¤ect of terrorism are
of the form:
yijt = t + j + (f(Terroristjt 1)) + jt+ Djt + Xijt + "ijt
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yijt is the outcome variable - investment in agricultural technology by the
household i in district j in year t16 and Djt and Xijt are district and household
controls. t are year e¤ects that are included to account for any time-specic
e¤ects in both investment in agriculture and terrorism across the state as a
whole. These would help in controlling for any linear trends in both agricul-
tural technology and terrorism that would otherwise lead to an omitted variable
bias. District xed e¤ects or j can account for all unobservables or observables
that are xed within a district and across time. These could be a districts size,
distance from the international border, terrain, culture, religious intensity, legal
and political institutions and other unobservable characteristics that are xed in
a district and may potentially be correlated with terrorism. Comparing perfor-
mance of districts with each other can lead to spurious correlations. In a study
done at the farmer-level, we can look within a district over time rather than
across districts. The term jt includes all within-district time trends that are
correlated with terrorism, for example, di¤erent rates of technology adoption
in di¤erent districts (such as adoption of tractors or HYV crops) that could be
correlated with terrorism. The problem of reverse causality is also avoided as
the investments are taken at the level of the farmer whose investment is assumed
to be small enough to not have any impact on district terrorist killings. There
could potentially be an issue of endogeneity associated with the regression if the
investment data was at the level of the sub-district or the district17 .
We are interested in the estimate of , which would give us the e¤ect of
that function of terrorist killings in the past year on the investments of the
farmer in the present year if there is no endogeneity. As we only know the
total investments and killings in a given year, taking the previous years killings
should give us the cleanest estimate.
5.2 Application of the specication
In our baseline specication, the independent variable of interest, f(Terroristjt 1)
is taken to be log(Terroristjt 0:5). This is log of terrorist killings in district
j in that calendar year if there are killings. If there are no major terrorist
incidents, it has been assigned a value of zero18 . For example, if yijt (invest-
ment) is recorded from July 1984 to June 1985, (Terrorist)jt 0:5 refers to the
total number of terrorist killings in district j in the calendar year 1984. The
use of the unconventional subscript t   0:5 has been taken because of the 6
month di¤erence in timings of the investment surveys and the data on terrorism
16 In accordance with the model, one could also construct a binary variable that takes value
equal to 1 if investment is non-zero and 0 otherwise. However, in the data, there are only
33 farmers out of 510 who do not invest in well equipment in a year. Moreover, the data
denition of investment in wells also includes maintenance expenditure which is unlikely to
be 0.
17For instance, Moradi (2005) nds that a drop in agricultural production and lack of
nutrition is linked to civil wars in Africa.
18There is no case where terrorist killings are one, so log 1 will never be calculated. Another
way of looking at log(Terrorist)jt is an interaction between a dummy for terror and log of
the killings.
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incidents. The function log is chosen because investment is likely to be very
sensitive to the rst few killings but will respond less when terrorist killings
become more common. Moreover, log is commonly used in regression analysis
to check for non-linear e¤ects and here, the results are robust qualitatively if a
linear function is considered.
I construct three measures of terrorism: rst, log terrorist, is log of the total
annual killings by terrorists in a district19 . Second is the intensity of terrorism
(log intensity), which measures how many people were killed on average in
terrorist incidents in that district in that calendar year. Intensity can measure
on average the lethality of a terrorist incident. The third measure, dummyterror
is a dummy for whether the district experienced terrorism in that year or not.
As one representative farmer from each sub-district is surveyed every year,
the values of the district level variables have been superimposed over the sub-
districts belonging to that district. There is a six-month overlap between the
survey and terrorism data, so our estimates could su¤er from the problem of
farmers changing their investment before the terrorist attack. This could bias
our results, but to the extent that we take the investments at the end of June,
the farmer still has a full six months after potentially the last terrorist attack
to make changes to his investments. Moreover, the actual timing of investments
in a calendar year as explained in the penultimate section would mitigate the
problem even further.
6 Results
Running the baseline specication, columns (1)-(3) in table 3 report the
results of the impact of each of the three terrorist measures on investment in
wells controlling for the twelve district and ten year dummies (July, 1980 to
June, 1990) as terrorism begins in 1981. If there is a major terrorist attack in a
district in a year, it causes a decline of more than 20% on average on investment
in wells. The estimates for impact on fertilizer investment are negative but
measured with high standard error and so are insignicant and even the impacts
are half as large as those for terrorist killings and dummy for terrorism on
investment in wells. We also see that terrorist killings, intensity of attack and
presence of terrorism have coe¢ cients that are signicant at the 1% level for
investment in wells. However, our estimates may be biased because there may
be trends in agriculture, for instance declining returns to the Green Revolution
that may di¤er across districts or there may be di¤erent returns to adoption
of new technologies. If this is indeed the case, or there are any other issues
such as population growth at di¤erent rates that is driving both investment and
terrorism, then our estimates would not give consistent results.
Columns (4)-(6) show results after including within-district linear trends.
There are twelve of these (1 for each district) and their value increases by 1 at
19Another functional form that can be employed is log(1+terrorist ). The correlation be-
tween this variable and the one used in our regressions is 0.9991. Using the alternative form
makes almost no di¤erence to our estimates and standard errors.
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the end of each year for that particular district and is 0 for all other districts.
Although the estimates for log killingsand dummyterrorare signicant now
only at the 5% level, yet the impacts are still large in magnitude for investment
in wells.
Miguel (2005) uses rainfall variation to estimate the impact of income shocks
on murder in rural Tanzania. Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2006) also look
at weather variation to estimate the causal e¤ect of growth on probability of
conict in Africa. Even though the historical literature points to economic and
political factors leading to the insurgency, violence in Punjab could have been
related to income shocks through rainfall and including rainfall as a regressor
should certainly make our estimates more accurate. I control for rainfall at
the farm level (measured by the nearest weather station to the farm village)
and also for soil quality (5 distinct types and percentage area under each type),
total family members, crop intensity and area held and nd that it makes little
di¤erence to our estimates. It is important to check after controlling for area
held as it has been shown to be an important determinant of investment in wells
(Fujita and Hussain, 1995). These control variables have been added for greater
e¢ ciency as these are not captured by either year or district xed e¤ects. As
crop intensity and area held may be jointly determined with the amount of
investment in wells and fertilizers, I check with their exclusion as well but the
results remain virtually the same. The estimates are slightly reduced, but even
here, their signicance remains intact.
There may still be problems with this regression as districts growing eco-
nomically at di¤erent rates may be determining both conict and agricultural
investment. Without controlling for district income, one may argue that the
estimates may be biased especially if poorer districts are more prone to con-
ict and also have lower growth in long-run investment. Therefore, in columns
(7)-(9), I also include district income (under other controls) for all these years.
The presence of a major terrorist incident in a district leads to an average
fall in well investment of around 17%. The gure is close to the estimate ob-
tained from using the coe¢ cient on log terrorist killings and nding the e¤ect of
"average number of killings" on well investment, which turns out to be 16%. In
table 4, this gure drops to 6% for fertilizers which is insignicant. This points
to a novel result in the paper - terrorism a¤ects long-term investment but has
little e¤ect on short-term investment.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log terrorist -87.79*** -62.43** -54.87**
(30.64) (24.84) (26.30)
log intensity -107.3*** -91.02*** -87.74***
(35.49) (31.20) (32.61)
dummyterror -205.1*** -181.8** -169.7**
(77.35) (70.35) (71.50)
District and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-district trend No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.347 0.346 0.343 0.379 0.381 0.380 0.395 0.397 0.396
Observations 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510
2) There are 12 district dummies (1 for each district) and 10 year dummies (1981-1990).
3) Other controls include annual district income, rainfall at the farm level (measured by the nearest weather station to
the farm village), soil quality of farm (5 types), total family members, crop intensity and area held.
Table 3: Effect of terrorism on well investment
Dependent variable: Investment in wells equipment
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level and are in parenthesis.
Notes:
1) log terrorist is log of all positive killings by terrorists in a district in a year. If killings are 0, this variable takes the value
of 0. The variable intensity is found by dividing the total terrorist killings by the total number of terrorist incidents.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log terrorist -42.28* -23.93 -21.87
(24.13) (28.63) (28.41)
log intensity -36.89 -9.628 -9.061
(32.47) (35.41) (35.04)
dummyterror -103.60 -65.81 -63.96
(63.84) (69.61) (68.76)
District and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-district trend No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.407 0.404 0.406 0.424 0.423 0.424 0.440 0.439 0.423
Observations 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510
3) Other controls include annual district income, rainfall at the farm level (measured by the nearest weather station to
the farm village), soil quality of farm (5 types), total family members, crop intensity and area held.
Table 4: Effect of terrorism on fertilizer investment
Dependent variable: Investment in fertilizers
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level and are in parenthesis.
Notes:
1) log terrorist is log of all positive killings by terrorists in a district in a year. If killings are 0, this variable takes the value
of 0. Non-zero killings are always greater than or equal to 3 by definition of a major terrorist incident. log terrorist is log
of all positive killings by terrorists in a district in a year. If killings are 0, this variable takes the value of 0. The variable
intensity is found by dividing the total terrorist killings by the total number of terrorist incidents.
2) There are 12 district dummies (1 for each district) and 10 year dummies (1981-1990).
Next, I test for lagged e¤ects of terrorism on investments as well as income
per hectare. Looking at columns (1)-(3) in table 5, we nd that only coe¢ cient
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log terrorist (t) -50.80* -23.73 31.27
(28.70) (27.97) (129.50)
log terrorist (t-1) 31.44 -14.75 -230.05*
(31.80) (24.13) (128.18)
log intensity (t) -80.43** -18.68 28.63
(36.00) (36.80) (157.17)
log intensity (t-1) 24.50 -45.90 -378.76**
(44.50) (29.95) (157.79)
dummyterror (t) -168.40** -61.87 109.11
(78.40) (67.73) (333.43)
dummyterror (t-1) 39.04 -44.30 -588.56*
(78.60) (60.54) (320.33)
District and year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within-district trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.40 0.41 0.40 0.23 0.24 0.23
Observations 453 453 453 453 453 453 453 453 453
Table 5: Checking for lagged effects of terrorism
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level and are in parenthesis.
Notes:
Wells Fertilizers Net income per hectare
1) log terrorist is log of all positive killings by terrorists in a district in a year. If killings are 0, this variable takes the value
of 0. Non-zero killings are always greater than or equal to 3 by definition of a major terrorist incident. The variable
intensity is found by dividing the total terrorist killings by the total number of terrorist incidents.
2) Here, terrorist (t-1) measures the total number of terrorist killings in a district in the year one year prior to the normal
terrorist (t) variable. This means there is a clear lag of six months from the year when terrorist (t-1) is calculated and
when investment is recorded. In terrorist (t) there was a six month overlap between the terrorism and investment data.
on terrorism in the year when the survey starts is signicant. The variable, log
terrorist (t-1) is based on the killings in the year prior to when the survey starts.
Therefore, the end dates of the record for the terrorist incidents and the farm
surveys are 18 months apart. Further lags give similar results.
The coe¢ cients on lagged terrorism in columns (4)-(6) show a negative and
insignicant e¤ect as is the case for contemporary terrorism. The results mean
that even though there is an e¤ect of terrorism on investment in wells in the
short-run, it is not persistent in the long-run. If long-term investment is a¤ected,
we should see an e¤ect on the incomes of the farmer as well. I check for this
e¤ect and nd that the negative e¤ect kicks in with lagged terrorism. Therefore,
it takes a year for the decline in investment to potentially show up as a fall in
income per hectare.
7 Robustness checks
Another short-term investment that farmers spend their income on are seeds.
Here too, we should see little change in investment due to terrorism. Regressions
in columns (1)-(3) in table 6 show that coe¢ cients are insignicant and positive.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
log terrorist 55.86 -0.17 -53.25** -20.69
(39.21) (9.33) (26.58) (24.53)
log intensity 66.26 7.02 -87.51** -5.32
(49.42) (15.58) (34.07) (31.82)
dummyterror 130.36 24.54 -167.16** -57.27
(88.20) (34.07) (71.60) (60.07)
log murder 63.39 65.93 77.47 26.13 23.74 24.10 -58.20 -52.59 -68.19 -17.81 -25.10 -22.30
(69.18) (69.94) (77.19) (31.63) (32.07) (31.49) (122.17) (124.32) (123.21) (88.47) (87.99) (88.34)
log theft -101.38** -85.24* -107.91** -1.40 1.84 0.06 18.08 -8.40 21.82 -3.35 -0.57 -1.45
(49.49) (44.10) (49.75) (24.56) (28.08) (24.32) (77.15) (78.59) (77.20) (82.90) (82.22) (83.14)
All other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.44 0.44 0.44
Observations 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510 510
Table 6: Robustness checks using alternative outcomes and additional controls
1) All other controls include district fixed effects, year dummies, within district trends, annual district income, rainfall at the farm level (measured by
the nearest weather station to the farm village), soil quality of farm (5 types), total family members, crop intensity and area held.
2) murder and theft are absolute numbers of the crimes in each district over the period 1978-1989 (inclusive of both years). These are available from the
Crime Records Bureau, New Delhi, India.
3) Seeds and Implements are annual expenditures on seeds and implements respectively by the selected farmer.
4) The variable log terrorist is log of all positive killings by terrorists in a district in a year. If killings are 0, this variable takes the value of 0. Non-zero
killings are always greater than or equal to 3 by definition of a major terrorist incident. The variable intensity is found by dividing the total terrorist
killings by the total number of terrorist incidents.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the village level and are in parenthesis.
Notes:
Seeds Implements Wells Fertilizers
For long-term investment, wells is a special case on two accounts - rst, it is
mostly immobile and second, the maintenance of a well is not essential for
growing crops. On the other hand, expenditure on implements includes the cost
of repairs, replacements and servicing. These expenditures are essential and are
on average less than a quarter of the expenditure required on equipments for
wells and tubewells. Secondly, implements used for farming are mobile as the
farmer can easily carry them with him when he migrates (in fact, he would be
inclined to take them if he is starting on a new farm). Therefore, we should not
observe a huge e¤ect on investment into implements of terrorism. In columns
(4)-(6) in table 6, we observe negligibly small and positive but insignicant
e¤ects. In regressions (7)-(9), I also control for log murders and log thefts
as proxies for the security presence within a district in a given year but nd
estimates on crime variables to be very small and insignicant in explaining
investment in wells. Our earlier estimates though slightly reduced still remain
robust and signicant.
For investment in fertilizers too, the estimates go down but they remain
insignicant and negative. I also test controlling for the three combinations by
including any two terrorism variables out of the three, and the results show
insignicance for both coe¢ cients due to the multicollinearity problem. Also,
the results remain the same even if we take quadratic trends in the state.
Additionally, an alternative specication can also include the previous years
investment by the farmer on the right hand side. However, this can be unbi-
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asedly estimated with the Arellano-Bond GMM estimator. As I do not have
the previous years investment of the same farmer, this is not in my baseline
specication. However, as we have a relatively small T and large N, it makes
sense to do a robustness check with the Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel GMM
estimator by assuming that the previous farmer surveyed from the same sub-
district would be similar to the present farmer. I implement this and nd that
my coe¢ cient on dummyterror is actually larger and more signicant. See Table
A1 in Appendix for details.
8 Concerns
There could be at least ve concerns about interpreting  as causal. First,
any policy change (for instance, number of police personnel) within a district
that is correlated with terrorism and also a¤ects investment has not been ac-
counted for. However, if changes in policy of security are captured by crime lev-
els, then including crime variables (such as murder and theft) does not change
our results.
Second, due to a six months overlap between the terrorism and investment
data, it is possible for some of the investments to have actually been made be-
fore the terrorist attack. This could bias our results, but the farmer still has a
full six months after potentially the last terrorist attack to make changes to his
investments. Another important reason why the bias is likely to be insignicant
for investment into wells can be explained by the timing of investments in a
calendar year. There are two main crops in Punjab, wheat and rice paddy20 .
Farmers normally irrigate just before they apply fertilizers to the crops. Looking
at Figure 2, we see that wheat is sown around early November, so manure is used
along with irrigated water around this time. Then, well water is needed around
January and February together with chemical fertilizers (nitrogen, phosphate
and potash). For paddy, rainfall in the months of July and August is usu-
ally su¢ cient along with the same chemical fertilizers (the blue shaded region).
Therefore, the main requirement for well irrigation is after the rainy season and
before January. This implies, that a rational farmer will make his investments
into well equipment only in the later part of the calendar year (around October
and November). Fortuitously, this coincides with clean timing of the terrorist
incidents, since most terrorist incidents would have already taken place by then.
In case the farmer wants to hedge the risk of rainfall in July, he would invest
before July, again mitigating the overlap problem.
Third, the estimate could be biased if households built the wells early on in
each district and later they were only spending on maintenance. There would
be a discontinuity somewhere for each district depending on how developed
that district is leading to a spurious correlation between increase in terrorism
and decrease in wells expenditure. However, there are at least three reasons
why these would not lead to a bias. First, almost all households had sunk wells
20 In 1980-81, for example, Punjabs contribution to the central pool of wheat was 73% and
45% to rice.
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Figure 2: Timing of investment into fertilizers and wells with the shaded area
showing rainy season
(if not tube wells), so the expenditure was mainly on their maintenance and
buying new equipment and not on construction of new wells per se showing
that investment can be assumed to have a continuum of values as opposed to
being lumpy (and is observed to be so in the data). Second, even if it is the
case that there are discontinuities at di¤erent stages in the districts, it is not
obvious why these would be correlated systematically with the irregular pattern
of terrorism in the districts, for instance, terrorism falls in 1985 and 1989 due
to peace agreements. Finally, we have included district-specic time trends to
account for di¤erent rates of new technology adoption.
Fourth, one would expect the investment in equipment for tube wells to
depend on access to credit markets (Dhawan, 1977), price of diesel for use in
motors (Shah and Ballabh, 1997), knowledge of the farmer and other farmer-
level unobservables. Controlling for all these would undoubtedly improve the
e¢ ciency of our estimates and help us in understanding the channels better.
However, for any bias in the reduced form regressions, terrorism levels in the
district should be correlated with these household level characteristics. Also,
these should not already be proxied for by household-level controls in our re-
gressions (e.g. household income, family size, soil quality and cropping intensity)
or by district trends and income levels. A related concern (on understanding
the channels) is that the e¤ect of counterinsurgency measures cannot be totally
captured as we do not have information on government spending on counterin-
surgency. We observe the equilibrium number of terrorist killings given the
counterinsurgency spending. Therefore, we do not know the e¤ect of counterin-
surgency via increased policing, but only the reduced form e¤ect of the increase
in terrorist killings21 . However, I do control for district income which should
be a good proxy for spending on districts spending on counterinsurgency and
other law enforcing activities.
One problem that has been ignored so far is selection bias related to farmers
and villages. As farmers in our study all own bullock-carts, it is clear that the
sample cannot be representative of farmers owning tractors. It may also be the
case that an unobservable characteristic of a farmer is driving him towards both
investing in bullock-cart instead of a tractor and reducing investment in wells in
response to terrorism. This unobservable characteristic is an omitted variable
21To get at that precise e¤ect, one would need spending on counterinsurgency activities at
the district level but this is condential information.
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that I do not have data to control for. However, it is important to notice that for
the vast majority of farmers during the 1980s, bullock carts were the primary
mode of cultivation. Second, any secular adoption in tractors technology can
be captured by district trends. The impact is also likely to be a lower bound of
the true e¤ect as they could have used the money to buy tractors. The selection
of villages could also inuence the bias as they are not chosen randomly. To
the extent that the selection of villages that are surveyed is not correlated with
terrorism (the study surveys a village for four consecutive years on average and
it also does not mention terrorism), we do not have a bias. However, it may be
reasonable to think that villages selected were less prone to terrorism, due to
safety concerns of the researcher who was required to make monthly visits to
the farmers being surveyed. If this is the case, then the impact would again be
a lower bound of the true causal e¤ect of terrorism on investment.
9 Heterogeneous e¤ects
As suggested in the conceptual framework, the impact of terrorism on in-
vestment is likely to vary by wealth of farmer. In particular, if the absolute risk
aversion channel dominates other channels, we should observe richer farmers
show less fall in long-term investment relative to poorer farmers. This could be
tested by interacting a measure of terrorism (here, I use dummyterror) with a
dummy for rich farmer which takes value one if the farmer is above the 90th
percentile level of gross farm income per capita. The coe¢ cient gives the e¤ect
of presence of terrorism if the farmer is rich and  tells us by how much addi-
tional investment is a¤ected by terrorism if the farmer is rich rather than poor.
The hypothesis predicts that the rich should respond more to the attacks as
they may be more mobile and may also be a target of more extortion. In other
words, we expect  to be negative but  to be positive. However, there may be
an endogeneity problem if investment in agricultural technology a¤ects whether
one is categorized as rich or poor (but this is unlikely to happen in the same
year). The empirical specication for testing heterogeneous e¤ects is as follows:
yijt = :richijt+ (dummyterrorjt 0:5)+ (dummyterrorjt 0:5  richijt)+
t + j + jt+ "ijt
Table 7 shows that estimates for  are  negative and signicant and  is
positive. These results also hold if we dene dummy on area held as opposed
to income per capita. This implies that there may have been adverse changes
to complementary inputs used by richer farmers during terrorism. These e¤ects
are strong enough to dominate the declining absolute risk aversion channel.
Another hypothesis that can be tested is that families with more members
are likely to have higher costs of moving to an outside option (for instance,
by migrating) and so would not reduce their investment in wells as much as
smaller families. In columns (3) and (4), we get a weaker conrmation of our
hypothesis. Only very large families (those above the 95th percentile) seem
to show signicant positive interaction e¤ects with dummyterror. This means
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
dummyterror -144.11* -123.15* -197.78*** -199.2*** -166.07*
(68.32) (71.29) (70.81) (73.38) (93.66)
rich1 565.83*
(302.10)
dummyterror*rich1 -870.68***
(321.57)
rich2 12.44
(142.6)
dummyterror*rich2 -369.29**
(165.20)
familysize1 -113.88
(108.92)
dummyterror*familysize1 441.95**
(172.07)
familysize2 -122.32
(99.74)
dummyterror*familysize2 145.45
(161.66)
border -279.02**
(128.31)
dummyterror*border -269.04*
(141.44)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.29
Observations 510 510 510 510 510
4) Other controls for regressions (1)-(4) include district fixed effects, year
dummies, within district trends, rainfall at the farm level (measured by the
nearest weather station to the farm village), soil quality of farm (5 types), crop
and intensity.
5) Other controls for regression (5) are year fixed effects, soil quality, net rainfall,
total family members and crop intensity.
Table 7: Heterogeneous effects on type and location of farmer
Notes:
1) rich1 and rich2 are dummies that take value 1 for farmers above the 95th and
90th percentile of per capita farm income level and 0 otherwise.
2) familysize1 and familysize 2 are dummies that take value 1 for households
above the 95th and 90th percentile of total household members and 0 otherwise.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.  Robust standard errors are clustered at the village
level and are in parenthesis.
Dependent variable: Investment in wells equipment
3) border is a dummy for the three bordering districts.
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that smaller and medium-sized families reduce their investment in wells much
more than very large families. In both cases, the estimate for  always remains
negative and signicant.
Geography in terms of proximity to international borders can also have an
e¤ect on investment. However, it would be interesting to know if there is an
additional e¤ect of being close to the border and having terrorism over and
above the e¤ect of terrorism in a non-border district and being a border district
not experiencing terrorism. We dene three districts (Amritsar, Gurdaspur and
Ferozepur) as bordering districts because they share a border with Pakistan.
After controlling for trends in these districts, we observe a negative interac-
tion coe¢ cient in column (5) implying that investments in bordering areas are
particularly sensitive to terrorism.
10 Policy implications and conclusion
The World Bank report (2004) hypothesized that the agricultural growth
rate plummeted from 6 percent to 2 percent during 1987-1992 because of a
decline in long-term investment associated with the uncertainty surrounding
militancy activities. I nd that presence of terrorism in a district in a year
reduces long-term xed investment by around 17% after controlling for time
trends, district xed e¤ects, within-district time trends and a range of other
controls. These results are consistent with the results found adverse e¤ects of
violence on long-term investments in education in Peru (Leon, 2009) and health
in Burundi (Bundervoet et al, 2009). There is also evidence for a reduction in
income of the farmer due to terrorism a year after the e¤ect on investments.
In table 5, we see that terrorism has a negative lagged e¤ect on net income
per hectare after controlling for year and district xed e¤ects as well as within-
district trends. I nd that on average a farmer a¤ected by terrorism in his
district loses Rs. 3084 on an average income in 1981 of Rs. 33482. This is a
9.2% loss. However, the probability of an attack in a district between 1981-90
is 42.85%. This implies that an average farmer in the state loses 3.94% of his
income annually because of the Punjab insurgency during 1981-90. It is con-
sistent with evidence which shows that irrigation is associated with a decrease
in rural poverty and an increase in agricultural growth in India (Bhattarai and
Narayanmoorthy, 2003).
We also see that richer farmers are more responsive to terror attacks and very
large families tend to be less responsive. Wang et al. (2006) provide evidence
for the higher likelihood of richer farmers in China to be water sellers from
tubewells in the groundwater market because of higher xed costs for the poor
farmer. If this is also the case in Punjab, a drop in tube well investment by
the richer farmers would also have spillover e¤ects on poorer farmers distorting
their decisions.
Concrete policy implications would depend on the channels. On the demand-
side, there could be an e¤ect on the wealth of the farmer through a decrease
in the returns to investments or an increase in their variability. Policy rec-
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ommendations would depend on nding the quantitative signicance of each
mechanism. Similarly, on the supply side, price of inputs (wages or cost of
capital) could increase leading to a decline in investment. The price and avail-
ability of diesel and electricity could have been a¤ected. However, at least in the
short-run, Bhargava et al (2009) report that farmers in Punjab have an inelastic
price elasticity of demand for electricity, though this may not be true during
conict. Also, violence could have resulted in credit becoming more expensive
due to greater uncertainty. This would again lead to a decline in investment
for farmers who needed to borrow for their production. If the credit channel is
important, then the government could consider setting up a centralized micro-
nance scheme wherein other states pool in to compensate for correlated shocks
(like oods, drought or terrorism) in all districts in a state.
In line with our nding that long-term investments of farmers living in bor-
der districts were di¤erentially a¤ected by terrorism, the Planning Commission
Report (2002) observes that generation of additional employment was adopted
as the core concern of the States Eighth Plan (1992-97) with the border dis-
tricts of Gurdaspur, Amritsar and Ferozepur receiving special focus as they were
major victims of the militancy.
Although, we may conclude that investment into long-term equipment was
a¤ected more, this does not necessarily imply that governments should have
subsidized the equipment. For example, it may be the case that water table did
not decline by as much during conict because digging deeper tubewells was
a long-term investment. Wang et al. (2006) show that increased use of tube
wells in China was correlated with an increase in income and productivity but
also contributed to a fall in groundwater levels. This would imply a trade-o¤
between agricultural productivity during conict and after it. Future studies
could potentially look at the impact of conict on the environment that takes
place through changes in human behavior.
In terms of the contribution of the paper, I show a unique but intuitive
result whereby farmers reduce long-term investments more relative to short-
term investments in response to terrorism and this e¤ect is greater for the richest
farmers and those from bordering districts. The signicance of the channels is
yet to be properly evaluated and this seems like a promising area for further
research.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dummyterror -212.8** -52.70
(83.63) (68.97)
log terrorist -84.29*** -26.20
(31.24) (26.58)
log intensity -108.9*** 0.761
(38.49) (33.58)
Constant 161.1 100.3 190.4 -350.5 -392.0 -306.1
(574.9) (566.3) (565.2) (548.5) (545.9) (549.7)
Observations 401 401 401 401 401 401
Number of sub-districts 46 46 46 46 46 46
2) There are 12 district dummies (1 for each district) and 10 year dummies (1981-1990)
3) Other controls in the background include annual district income, rainfall at the farm level (measured
by the nearest weather station to the farm village), soil quality of farm (5 types), total family members,
crop intensity and area held.
Table A1: Effect of terrorism on investment using the Arellano-Bond estimation procedure
Wells Fertilizers
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Notes:
1) log terrorist is log of all positive killings by terrorists in a district in a year. If killings are 0, this
variable takes the value of 0. Non-zero killings are always greater than or equal to 3 by definition of a
major terrorist incident.
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